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Abstract
Having faced high unemployment rates for more than a decade, the German
government implemented a comprehensive set of labour market reforms
during the period 2003-2005. This paper describes the economic and institu-
tional context of the German labour market before and after these so-called
Hartz reforms.Focussing on active policy measures,we delineate the rationale
forreformanditsmainprinciples.Asresultsofprogrammeevaluationstudies
post-reform have become available just now,we give a first assessment of the
effectiveness of key elements of German ALMP before and after the
Hartz reforms. The evidence indicates that the re-organisation of public
employment services was mainly successful, with the exception of the
outsourcing of services. Re-designing training programmes seems to have
improved their effectiveness, while job creation schemes continue to be
detrimental for participants’ employment prospects. Wage subsidies and
start-upsubsidiesshowsignificantlypositiveeffects.Onbalance,therefore,the
reform seems to be moving the German labour market in the right direction.
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In times of high unemployment,the necessity of labour market reforms is dis-
cussedalloverEurope.Manycountrieshaveeitherstartedoralreadyfinished
far-reaching reforms. Also in Germany the need for reforms had become ap-
parent over the past decades, when unemployment was rising constantly and
public budgets tightened.Finally in 2002,the government took advantage of a
scandal involving the federal employment office1 to overcome the so-called
reform logjam (“Reformstau”) and start a series of rather radical – given the
prior reluctance – policy changes.
The resulting Hartz reforms – named after the chairman heading the com-
mission that worked out the reform package – constitute a comprehensive
modification of active and passive labour market policies.It is considered the
most far-reaching reform endeavour in the history of the German welfare
state,andconsistsoffourlawsHartzI–IVthatweregraduallyimplementedon
Jan 1st 2003 (Hartz I and II), Jan 1st 2004 (Hartz III), and Jan 1st 2005 (Hartz




demand by deregulating the labour market. To this end, the reform radically
modernised the organizational structure of public employment services,
modified many of the already existing measures of Active Labour Market
Policy (ALMP) and introduced a set of new ones. The reform fundamentally
changed the institutional and legal framework that determines the rights and
duties of the unemployed,most importantly,the benefit system.Furthermore,
employment protection was reduced in some segments of the labour market.
In this context, it is also the first time in the history of the German welfare
state that a policy reform is accompanied by a comprehensive scientific eval-
uation. The government explicitly tied the implementation of the Hartz laws
to an evaluation mandate.Given the scope of the reform endeavour,the eval-
uation was commissioned by the government as a set of work packages and
modules, aiming at an evaluation of both the Hartz reforms in their entirety
and each particular element on its own.2 In practice, the Hartz evaluation
therefore has involved more than 20 economic and sociological research in-
stituteswho,usingmethodsbasedonqualitativecasestudyapproachesaswell
as rigorous econometric analyses of administrative and survey data, face the
challenge of disentangling impacts of specific measures in a setting charac-
terised by (a) the simultaneous alteration of measures and institutional
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1 The federal employment office was accused of massive fraud in the reporting of successful job
placements.
2 Fertig/Kluve (2004) develop a conceptual framework for this endeavour.context, and (b) by the fact that many measures affect every worker, i.e. no
comparison group exists.First results of these evaluation studies have become
available just now.
In this paper, we describe the economic and institutional context of the
Germanlabourmarketbeforeandafterthereform.Focussingonactivepolicy
measures,wedelineatetherationaleforreformanditsmainprinciples.Weuse
the most recent empirical evidence to discuss the effectiveness of key el-
ements of German ALMP before and after the Hartz reforms.
The paper is organized as follows:Section 2 gives an overview of the German
economic situation since unification in 1990, briefly characterizing the prob-
lematic features of the East and West German labour markets. We also de-
scribe the institutional framework before Hartz, focussing on active labour
market policies and the organisational structure of public employment
services,and discuss the main weaknesses of the institutional setting that mo-
tivated the reform. Section 3 delineates core elements of the Hartz reforms
and the reform strategy in some detail. In Section 4 we review both the
hitherto existing and the most recent evidence from evaluation research to
assess the effectiveness of active labour market policy before and after the
reform.Section 5 concludes.
2. Economic Situation and Labour Market Institutions before Hartz
Since the 1990s,Germany has shown to be unable to benefit from favourable
conditions in the global economy. From 1991 until 2003 GDP grew by only
18%, which is half the growth of the United Kingdom (35%) or the Neth-
erlands (34%) during that period. Low growth rates have been unable to
create employment. Employment even slightly decreased (by 0.4%) and un-
employmentratesarehigherthanever,currentlyrangingbetween9.6%inthe
West and 18.6% in the East.
Certainly the unification in 1990 and its repercussions have contributed to
Germany’s poor performance. Unification suddenly increased the labour
force by roughly one third of workers,a large share of which was inadequately
trained for immediate employment in an open market economy. Despite the
need to first retrain the labour force and reshape the formerly centrally
planned economy, however, it was a core political objective to adjust East
German wages to the comparatively high West German levels as quickly as
possible. In contrast to other Central and Eastern European transition
countries having competitive wages levels to create sustainable growth, the
East German economy experienced rising unemployment and continuing de-
pendence on federal subsidies and transfer payments from West to East.
Apart from the high fiscal costs of unification,the Maastricht criteria reduced
the government’s scope for expansive growth policies further.
Performance of Active Labour Market Policy in Germany 5Only a small share of overall German unemployment is thought to be attrib-
utable to business cycle factors.Some studies argue that the German NAIRU
hasincreasedoverthepastdecades(e.g.Franz2001),indicatingthatstructural
factors play an important role in the German unemployment problem.
Figure 1 shows the development of unemployment and the number of partic-
ipants in training and job creation programmes for West and East Germany
during the time period 1991 to 2005. We observe a general increase in the
number of unemployed individuals in both parts of the country. Whereas in
West Germany the number of programme participants has been relatively
stable over this period,decreasing only slightly,the figures for East Germany
document the massive use of ALMP measures during the early 1990s and a
substantial decrease over recent years.
Labour market institutions
Compulsory unemployment insurance was introduced in Germany as early as
in 1927, complementing the then already existing insurances for health, ac-
cident and old age.After World War II a generous benefit system,financed by
contributions and taxes, emerged. Active labour market measures were in-
troduced when unemployment started to rise in the 1970s. Both active and
passivepolicymeasuresareadministeredbythefederalemploymentoffice.In
earlier years, when unemployment was still low, measures were designed to
preventratherthanfightunemployment,adaptingtheworkforcetostructural
changes in labour demand. After unification in 1990, active labour market
measures played a central role in alleviating the social consequences of the
breakdown of the economy in East Germany. In 1991, one third of the East
Germany workforce had participated in an active measure, mainly training
and public job creation schemes (Wunsch 2005).
The set-up of active and passive labour market policy in Germany during the
1990s can be characterised as follows: From the very beginning, unem-
ployment benefits were meant to maintain the worker’s social status during
unemployment rather than providing a safety net of last resort.All payments
madetotheindividualovertheentireperiodofunemploymentwerelinkedto
his or her previous earnings.Unemployment benefits,which were paid for the
first 6 to 32 months of unemployment (depending on previous employment
duration and age), amounted to 67% of the last net income (60% without
children), with a maximum level of 4 250 ¤ per month. Unemployment as-
sistance,whichwaspaidthereafterwithouttimelimit,stillreached57%(53%)
of the last net income.
The unlimited duration of unemployment benefit payments was an extraor-
dinary feature of the German unemployment benefit system, leading to re-
placement rates for long term unemployed which were higher than in any
other OECD country (OECD 2004).Replacement rates of short-term unem-
6 Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluveployed, in contrast, were – and still are – comparable to many other OECD
countries. Unemployment benefits were financed by unemployment in-
surance contributions shared by employers and employees, while unem-
ployment assistance was financed by taxes. In principle, unemployment as-
sistance was means-tested on a yearly base.It was possible to complement un-
employment insurance by tax-financed social assistance. Generally, every
household whose income fell below a certain income threshold qualified for
social assistance. The German benefit system combined generous benefit
levels with high benefit reduction rates that taxed away most of the additional
earned income of a benefit recipient. Thus, incentives to take up a job were
very low, especially for low skilled workers. Engels (2001) calculates that a
typical family with three children receiving social assistance in West Germany
intheyear2000receivedanincomethatwasonly15.3%belowtheincomeofa
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Figure 1
Source:IAB Nürnberg.comparable family with a single earner receiving an average unskilled
worker’s wage.In East Germany the respective difference was only 11.5%.
Compared to other countries, German active labour market policy in the
1990s was characterised by high expenditure levels and long durations of
programmes. Training and public job creation measures were the most im-
portant programmes in terms of expenditures and number of participants.
Measures supporting the direct integration into regular employment (e.g.
wagesubsidiesandstart-upsubsidies)onlyplayedaminorrole.Generally,job
search assistance and monitoring by the public employment agency was given
rather low priority.Sanctions for low engagement in job search activities were
rarely implemented.For most programmes,the law narrowly defined the type
of person who was eligible for participation in a programme. Assignment to
programmes was not based on a systematic profiling of each costumer, but
rather on caseworkers’ discretion.
3. Core Elements of the Hartz Reforms
As unemployment continued to increase in the 1990s, the social security
system ran the risk of financial collapse and the need for a comprehensive
reform of the institutional setting of labour market policies became urgent.In
both the political and academic debates the benefit system was criticised for
creating adverse work incentives and increasing long-term unemployment,
deteriorating skills and thus worsening the mismatch on the labour market.
The public employment services were blamed for operating inefficiently and
customer-unfriendly and failing to push jobseekers sufficiently to search for a
job.The mix of active measures,focusing on training measures and public job
creation schemes with long durations,was criticised for retaining participants
out of the open labour market instead of integrating them.Such criticism was
based on evaluation studies of active measures that indicated severe
locking-in effects and zero or even negative post-participation treatment
effects of many programmes.
In 2002 the government reacted to,and took advantage of,a scandal involving
the federal employment office3 by setting up an independent expert com-
mission,the“CommissionforModernLabourMarketServices”(Kommission
für Moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt). The commission’s recom-
mendations triggered a series of radical policy changes, the so-called Hartz
reforms4, which were subsequently implemented during the time period
2002–2005.The set of reform elements coalesce to a tripartite reform strategy
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3 The federal employment office presented palliated figures on the quantity of unemployed
workerswhothefederalemploymentofficeclaimedtohavere-integratedintothelabourmarket.
4 Named after the commission’s director Peter Hartz, the personnel director of Volkswagen at
the time.(Table 1). They aimed at, (a) improving labour market services and policy
measures in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, (b) activating the unem-
ployedbyenforcingtheso-calledprincipleof„rightsandduties”(Fördernund
Fordern), and, (c) fostering employment demand by deregulating the labour
market5.
To this end, the reform modified many of the already existing measures of
active labour market policy and introduced a set of new measures (cf. Fertig,
Kluve 2004 for an overview). It fundamentally changed the general
framework in which these measures operate and involved greater co-ordi-
nation of institutional arrangements, especially between active and passive
policy measures.Deregulating measures concentrated on the temporary work
sector, while the biggest changes entailed by the reform took place in the
realm of job placement services and the benefit system.
3. (a) Increasing Effectiveness and Efficiency of Services and Measures
The reform aimed to improve the performance of placement services and
policy programmes mainly by introducing market mechanisms to the realm of
placement services and by streamlining public employment services. Fur-
thermore, cost-effectiveness in the specific context of each regional labour
market is targeted to be the key criteria when choosing programme contents
and participants.
First,regarding their organisational structure,the public employment services
were modernised along the lines of New Public Management.The reform es-
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Cornerstones of the Hartz Reforms
(a) Increasing effectiveness and efficiency of labour market services and policy measures
– Re-organisation of local employment agencies
– Introduction of quasi markets
– Improved targeting
– Evaluation mandate
(b) Activating the unemployed
– Re-Organisation of the benefit system
– Sanctions
– New policy mix with priority to measures requiring proactive behaviour of the unemployed
– Make work pay
(c) Fostering employment demand by labour market deregulation
– Deregulation of the temporary work sector
– Exemptions from restrictions on fix-term contracts
– Exemptions from restrictions on dismissal protection
Table 1
5 The federal employment agency translates “Fördern und Fordern”as “Challenge and Promo-
tion”.tablished results-based accountability and controlling of local employment
agencies.Now,each employment agency has to fulfil quantitative goals which
are individually fitted to each type of agency,while at the same time having a
wider scope of discretion on the choice of policy mix. The formerly hierar-
chically organised employment offices were converted into costumer-ori-
entatedone-stop-centres.Therangeofservicesprovidedbythejobcentreshas
been extended, ranging from advising and counselling services to social
services and administration of benefit payments.The caseload of caseworkers
is targeted to be reduced and every jobseeker is assigned to a fixed case-
worker.
A second aspect regards quasi markets: The introduction of market forces is
expected to improve the quality of services and to break up the informal and
often inefficient insider relationships between public employment man-
agement and private providers. The reform introduced, for instance, voucher
systems for placement services and training measures.Each individual whom
the public employment service was unable to place after six weeks of unem-
ployment can choose an alternative private placement service. The private
service receives a lump sum payment after having placed the jobseeker suc-
cessfully.Providersoftrainingmeasures,too,canbechosenfreelybytheclient
and paid for with a voucher.
Thepublicemploymentservicecanchoosetooutsourceservicesfullyorpartly,
most importantly placement services. Public tendering became compulsory
for external contracts. One example is the placement via temporary work:
Since 2003, every local employment office sets up a “Staff Service Agency”
(Personal Service Agentur, PSA) that acts like a temporary work agency for
the unemployed.To this end,the local employment office either may contract
aprivatetemporaryworkagencyor,ifnoproviderisavailable,mayrunaPSA
by itself. The local employment office may delegate hard-to-place clients to
thePSA,whichinturnreceivesalumpsumfeeforeachworker.ThePSAmay
lendtheworkertemporarilytootherfirmsorprovideapermanentplacement.
During periods of inactivity,the PSA should provide training measures to the
worker.Therefore,PSAsencompassaspectsofbothtrainingmeasuresandjob
search assistance.
Third, the reform aims at improving the targeting of active measures and the
allocation of measures and resources.To this end,statutory regulation of eligi-
bility conditions is reduced,now leaving a wider scope for individually fitting
clients to measures.Assignment of clients to measures is now based on a pro-
filing process, which is highly standardised. The caseworker will assess the
client’s abilities, problems, and potential labour market chances in an in-
terview and thereafter assign the client to one out of four types: “Market
clients”(Marktkunden) are considered to have the highest chances of finding
10 Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluveemployment, “Clients for counselling and activation” (Beratungskunden
Aktivieren) range second and mainly need to be activated in their job search.
“Clients for counselling and support”(Beratungskunden Fördern) need more
attention and will likely be assigned to a programme,while “Clients in need of
supervision” (Betreuungskunden) need special attention since they face the
lowest chances of re-employment. Each type is linked to an action
programme,definingtheavailablemeasuresforthattypeofjobseeker.Active
labour market policy measures are available mainly for the types II “coun-
selling and activating” and III “counselling and supporting”. The type I
“market client” is expected to re-integrate without special assistance, while
thefourthtype,“supervising”,isdeemednotbenefitingfromanymeasureand
excluded from participation.
Many active policy measures were re-designed in terms of their target popu-
lation. For example, since the reform, selection into training measures delib-
erately targets cream skimming in order to choose those clients who will
benefit most from training. Only those clients will be admitted who are con-
jectured to have a 70% probability of finding a job after the measure. Ac-
cordingly,training providers have to produce a 70% success rate of respective
participants in order to be contracted by the employment agency.In contrast,
job creation measures are re-designed for merely targeting the very
hard-to-place unemployed. That means public employment shall constitute
marketreplacementandtherebypreserveemployabilityforthosewhoarenot
expected to find a way back into regular employment in the near future. In-
centives for unemployed workers to take up public employment rather than
regular employment were reduced as participants can no longer restore eligi-
bility for unemployment benefits after completing the measure. The re-
strictivetargetingoftrainingandjobcreationschemesaswellasthereduction
of programme durations induced a further reduction of participants and
spending for these measures. On average, participation in training will take
place at an earlier stage in the unemployment spell.
Last but not least,the need for rigorous scientific evaluation of programme ef-
fectiveness, in order to be able to continuously optimise existing programmes
on the basis of conclusive empirical evidence, was recognized by policy
makers, and a corresponding evaluation mandate was implemented with the
Hartz reforms. Hence, the Hartz reforms constitute the first major reform in
the history of the German welfare state that is accompanied by a compre-
hensive scientific evaluation on behalf of the government.The process started
with two competing pilot studies developing a conceptual framework for the
evaluation (Fertig et al. 2004; Hagen, Spermann 2004) and subsequently was
put out to tender.Currently more than 20 economic and sociological research
institutes with about 100 researchers are involved in the evaluation
(Bundesregierung 2006 for details of the set-up).
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The principle of “rights and duties” is the core element of the Hartz reforms.
The activation strategy is implemented in virtually every element of the
labourmarketpolicyframework,e.g.inthebenefitsystem:Whereasbeforethe
reform previous social security contribution was the key criteria for benefit
access, now the access to benefits and active labour market participation is
strictly conditional on a person’s ability to work.This is defined as being able
to work at least 15 hours a week.Those capable of working are assigned to the
employment agencies and will be subject to activation policies on the basis of
the principle of “rights and duties”. An unemployed person receives a so-
called benefit type I for the first 6 to 12 months of unemployment.Thereafter,
the person receives a lump sum means-tested benefit type II. Persons who
never made contribution payments but who are deemed capable of working
will receive the benefit type II right from the beginning.The benefit type II is
not earnings-based, as the unemployment assistance benefit had been in the
previous system, and is less generous than social assistance. Only those who
are not capable of working due to sickness, disability or care responsibilities
receive means-tested social assistance from the local authorities and are ex-
empted from “duties”.
The reform also introduced sanction elements, i.e. additional means to effec-
tively monitor the jobseeker’s job search activities and personal efforts to
re-integrate into the labour market. The jobseeker is obliged to accept any
offer of suitable work.The definition of suitable work was broadened,e.g.in-
cluding the obligation to move to a different city under certain circumstances.
Benefitreceiptisstrictlyconditionalontheavailabilityforworkandtheavail-
ability for programme participation. The individual action plan that results
from the profiling process is set out in a binding integration agreement
(Eingliederungsvereinbarung).Thiswrittenagreementstatesboththeservices
that will be provided to the job seeker as well as the job seeker’s obligation re-
garding job search activities and programme participation, where required.
An unemployed individual will be threatened by sanctions if he or she de-
viates from the integration agreement or does not cooperate appropriately.
Though possible in principle, sanctions in the form of temporary benefit re-
ductions are rarely applied in practice, since they used to provoke costly
lawsuits with benefit claimants. A person’s availability can additionally be
tested by training or by workfare measures in the public sector (the so-called
1-EURO-Jobs) or assignment to PSA.
The new policy mix is more strongly orientated towards measures for
jobseekers who proactively seek to improve their situation in a self-re-
sponsible way. There is more emphasis on measures that promote the direct
integrationintothelabourmarketasopposedtotrainingmeasuresandpublic
job creation schemes that keep participants out of the market for the duration
12 Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluveof the programme. Active measures that best represent the new activation
strategy are start-up subsidies. These are a relatively new component of
Germanactivelabourmarketpolicy.Thoughaso-called“bridgingallowance”
(Überbrückungsgeld) was introduced already in 1986, the number of partic-
ipantshasincreasedonlyrecently.Thebenefitispaidfor6monthsandisequal
to the unemployment benefit that the recipient had previously received or
could have received plus a lump-sum social security contribution. In order to
receive the grant,the chamber of commerce has to approve the business plan.
The reform introduced an alternative subsidy, the so-called Ich-AG (i.e. “Me,
Inc.”, or, as The Economist (Feb 2006) translates, “Me-company”) subsidy,
which is independent of prior social security contributions. It is paid for a
maximum period of three years as long as the claimant’s income does not
exceed 25,000 ¤ per year.It amounts to 600 ¤ per month in the first year,360 ¤
per month in the second and 240 ¤ per month in the third year.
Furthermore, the integration into paid employment may be supported by
several forms of wage subsidies which are paid to employers when hiring a
certain type of hard-to-place worker. The idea is to compensate the firm for
the presumably lower productivity of this type of worker. The Hartz reforms
simplified eligibility conditions of so-called integration subsidies in order to
facility the access to wage subsidies, giving priority to older and disabled
workers. Generally, maximum duration varies between 6 and 24 months, de-
pendingonthetargetgroupand,asarule,themaximumrateofsubsidyshould
not exceed 50% of the calculable remuneration.In order to avoid substitution
effects and free riding, payments are not available when the employer ap-
parently dismissed a worker in order to receive the benefit or when he had
already employed the respective worker within the previous four years. Fur-
thermore,the Hartz reform introduced social security subsidies for employers
who employ an older worker.A firm who employs a worker of age 55 or older
is exempt from contribution to the unemployment security system for this
worker.However,thecontributionamountstoonly3.25%ofthegrosswage.
Finally,variousreformelementsintendtomakeworkpay,aimingatincreasing
work incentives to the unemployed. The reform did not reduce the very high
marginal taxes on people who move from unemployment to employment.
Rather, new forms of wage subsidies were introduced and already existing
ones were modified or extended. The start-up subsidies mentioned above is
one example.Furthermore,the reform introduced incentives to workers aged
50 and older to take up employment even when it pays less than previous em-
ployment. In these cases, elderly workers may receive a wage subsidy, the
so-called wage protection, when they accept a job offer that pays less than
their previous job. The wage subsidy amounts to 50% of the difference
between the previous wage and the actual wage. It is paid for the same du-
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had remained unemployed.
Before the reform, policy makers had already tried out different forms of
wage subsidies for low income earners (e.g. “Mainzer Modell”). The Hartz
reform finally implemented a variant of previous models, the so-called
“Minijobs” and “Midijobs”. These schemes are generally applicable, i.e. they
are not confined to the unemployed.A Minijob is a job generating an income
below 400 ¤ per month.A person holding a Minijob is exempt from social se-
curity contributions,which effectively increases net wages.Jobs with incomes
between 400 and 800 ¤ are called Midijobs.For these jobs,social security sub-
sidies are paid at a decreasing rate, depending on the income, i.e. gradually
fading from zero contributions at 400 ¤ into full contributions at 800 ¤. Both
Mini- and Midijobs thus constitute “jobs with reduced social security contri-
butions”.
3. (c) Labour Market Deregulation
Deregulation of labour market institutions took place regarding temporary
work, dismissal protection and the regulation of fixed-term contracts. The
wage setting process,on the other hand,remains highly centralised.
Regarding temporary work regulations, the reform intended to facilitate the
expansion of the already booming sector of temporary work significantly.
Temporary work agencies were legalised in 1967 and formally regulated in
1972. Since then, temporary work had been regulated rather restrictively for
many years, and had been forbidden completely in the construction industry.
Since the late 1990s,the law has been gradually liberalised.The Hartz reform
finally abolished restrictions on synchronisation, re-assignment, fixed-term
contracts and the maximum duration of temporary employment. A new rule
wasintroducedrequiringthatatemporaryworkagencymusteitherguarantee
equal pay and equal treatment of temporary workers and regular workers or
join a collective bargaining agreement between trade unions and employers.
Temporary work is now also allowed in the construction industry, provided
that a collective bargaining agreement applies. So far, however, no such
contract has been agreed upon. As already mentioned, the law introduced a
public sponsored Staff Service Agencies as a new form of placement-ori-
entated temporary work for hard-to-place persons.
With respect to dismissal regulations and fixed-term contract regulations, the
reform did not deregulate standard employment relations in a general way.
Rather, it simplified and widened the number of cases for which exemptions
from the generally rather restrictive regulations apply.Before the reform,for
instance,exemptions from restrictions on fixed-term contracts were given for
employees aged 58 and over.For these employees,fixed-term contracts could
14 Lena Jacobi and Jochen Kluvebe renewed repeatedly without justification. The reform reduced the
minimum age for which this regulation applies to 52 years. Furthermore, ex-
emptions from dismissal protection, which before the reform were conceded
to small firms with 5 employees or less, will now include firms with up to 10
employees.
4. Labour Market Policy Effectiveness Before and After Hartz
ForalongtimetheevaluationofGermanALMPhadsufferedfromthelackof
suitable data. Only very recently good quality data has become relatively
widely available to researchers. Early studies on ALMP effectiveness were
usually based on the GSOEP (German SocioEconomic Panel) or, for East
Germany,the Labour Market Monitor East.The main drawback of these data
is that, due to rather small overall sample sizes and panel mortality, they
contain only few observations on participants of active labour market
measures. Researchers often had to group together heterogeneous measures
and some programmes could not be evaluated at all because participation was
not documented in the data.
Itwasonlyattheendofthe1990sthatthegovernmentstartedtoacknowledge
theneedforathoroughevaluationofactivelabourmarketpolicies,and,inthe
following years, considerable effort was made to derive large data sets from
administrativedataonthelocalemploymentagencylevel(Benderetal.2005).
These data provide a large number of observations and cover rather long time
periods.They therefore allow detecting short- as well as long-term effects and
provide enough information to better distinguish different types of treatment
andtoanalysetheoptimaltimingofevents.Thesemergedadministrativedata
have become available to researchers recently and seem to be able to provide
robustresults.MostoftheevaluationstudiesoftheHartzreformsmakeuseof
this type of data.
Early evaluation studies mainly concentrate on training and job creation
schemes,which for a long time were the most important measures in terms of
expenditure and number of participants (recall Figure 1). Fitzenberger/
Speckesser (2000) provide a survey on early evaluation studies in Germany,
most of which are based on the above-mentioned rather poor data.Caliendo/
Steiner (2005),who update that review,and Wunsch (2005),who discusses the
development of the German labour market since unification, include recent
pre-Hartzstudiesbasedonthenewandbetterdata.Thepost-Hartzstudieswe
discuss in the following sub-sections result from the evaluations of the Hartz
laws I-III.The evaluation of Hartz IV,which basically comprises the reform of
the benefit system and introduction of benefit type II combining unem-
ployment and social assistance,will only begin in autumn of 2006.
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Major policy changes aiming at improving effectiveness and efficiency of
already existing measures took place in the realm of placement services,
training and job creation schemes. In the following, we will discuss findings
from evaluation studies of these measures before and after the reform.Other
active policy measures that were re-designed under the reform are discussed
in the next section.
Placement Services
There are only two studies on the effectiveness of placement services before
the reform. The DEA-based benchmarking study by Mosley et al. (2003)
compares the relative efficiency in terms of activity (number of placements
and programme entrants in relation to staff inputs) and effectiveness (tran-
sitions into regular employment) of West German local employment offices.
The analysis is complemented with case studies of eight employment offices.
The results indicate strong differences in relative efficiency. The authors find
thatexogenousandendogenousfactorseachexplainroughly50%ofvariation
in efficiency, respectively. They suggest that average efficiency of labour
market offices could be increased by 19%.Hujer et al.(2005) study the effects
of two pilot measures of job search assistance (“Stellenmarktoffensive”) in
2001-2002 in the West German federal state of Hessen. The regional em-
ployment agency published a magazine for employers containing “em-
ployment wanted” advertisements among other things. The study finds
positive effects of this measure, especially for women. Furthermore, the em-
ployment agencies offered courses on job search activities that advise on
writing application letters, CVs, participating in job interview etc. Although
effects vary across groups, in the general picture these measures do not
produce positive results.
The Hartz-reform converted the former employment offices into costumer-
orientated one-stop-centres. These are assessed in the study by WZB/infas
(2005)usingaconditionalDifference-in-Differences-analysisthatexploitsthe
fact that one-stop-centres have been introduced at different points in time.
Ten employment service agencies that have already transformed into
one-stop-centres are matched to ten agencies that have not.Data is used from
the inflow into unemployment of the respective agencies.The results indicate
positive effects of one-stop-centres on the integration into regular em-
ployment,though the effects are not significant.This might be due to the fact
that the number of agencies used in the analysis is small and the observation
period at the present time is a maximum of nine months.The effects are more
positive in East Germany, where labour market conditions are worse, and
seem to work better for men than for women.
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paring clients who have made use of external placement services to clients
whohaveremainedunderthepublicemploymentservice.Externalplacement
servicescanbeutilisedeitherbytheclienthimself,usingaplacementvoucher,
or by the public employment service who can assign clients to external pro-
viders. Selection is controlled for by performing a combination of exact
matching with propensity score matching. The analysis is based on adminis-
trative data which is supplemented by survey data from telephone interviews
for a sub-sample. For placement vouchers, the results fail to find any sig-
nificant effect on the prospect of entering employment. It appears that many
clients who had received placement vouchers did not actually use them. In
East Germany, those who found a job using a placement voucher remain in
employment for a significantly shorter period than those who did not use
placement vouchers.The assignment of clients to private placement providers
by the public employment service also does not show significant effects.
Finally, the assignment to PSA produces significant locking-in effects that
delay the integration of workers into regular,non-PSA employment.
Training Measures
Training measures have been evaluated by numerous studies. Since studies
mostly focus on either East or West Germany,we will present results for each
region separately. Early evaluation studies on training in East Germany
include Lechner (1998,1999,2000),Hujer/Wellner (2000),which are based on
the GSOEP. Studies based on the Labour Market Monitor East include
Hübler (1997) and Fitzenberger/Prey (1998).Bergemann et al.(2000) use the
Labour Market Monitor East of the federal state Saxony-Anhalt, as do
Bergemann et al. (2004). Reinowski et al. (2003, 2004) use the Mikrozensus
Saxony. Recent studies based on merged administrative data are Hujer et al.
(2004a),Fitzenberger/Speckesser (2005),Lechner et al.(2005).
Many of the early studies either find positive effects or are unable to find any
significant effects of training programmes in East Germany. An exception is
Hübler(1997)whofindsnegativeeffectsforwomen.Thisresultcontrastswith
the finding of Bergemann et al. (2000) of significantly positive effects of
second treatments for women only. Bergemann et al. (2004) find positive
effects in the early 1990s and negative effects in later years.In general,studies
publishedfrom2000onwardstendtobemorepessimistic.BesidesBergemann
et al. (2004), also Lechner (2000) and Reinowski et al. (2003) find negative
effects of training participation. By and large, the results are mixed and it is
rather unclear what lesson can be drawn from these studies on the
programmes’ effectiveness.
Recent studies based on better administrative data seem to derive more con-
sistent results. Hujer et al. (2004a) use data from the period 1999–2002 and
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prehensive study is the one by Lechner et al.(2005) who use data covering the
period of 1993 to 2002. Due to the richness of the data, various types of
training programmes can be distinguished. Fitzenberger/ Speckesser (2005)
concentrate on “provision of specific professional skills” which is a special
type of further vocational training programmes. Lechner et al. (2005) dis-
tinguish short training (up to 6 months), long training (over 6 months), re-
training,and training in practice firms.
All studies based on the new data find significant evidence of locking-in
effects for virtually all types of training programmes, i.e. the labour market
performance is worse for participants compared to non-participants during
and shortly after participation. The central question is whether there are
positive effects in the medium and long run that are big enough to be able to
compensate these negative short run effects.The answer seems to depend on
theoutcomevariable.Forunemploymentduration,Hujeretal.(2004a)donot
find significant long term effects of short and medium training programmes
but find negative effects of long programmes, which means they increase un-
employment duration (here, a participating person is considered unem-
ployed).This contrasts with the other studies,Fitzenberger/Speckesser (2005)
and Lechner et al.(2005),who take the employment rate as outcome measure
and find positive effects in the long run for programmes that provide specific
professional skills (Fitzenberger,Speckesser 2005) as well as for short training
and retraining programmes (Lechner et al. 2005). Lechner et al. (2005) also
use monthly earnings as an outcome variable and again find positive effects in
the long run.
Early studies on training in West Germany include Pannenberg (1995),Hujer
et al. (1998) and Hujer/Wellner (2000). These studies use models of unem-
ployment duration and are based on GSOEP data covering the second half of
the1980sandtheearly1990s.Again,resultsaremixed:Pannenberg(1995)and
Hujer et al.(1998) do not find significant positive effects,while Hujer/Wellner
(2000) find positive effects, however, for short term programmes only. More
recentstudiesbasedonadministrativedataareKlose/Bender(2000),Lechner
et al. (2004) and Fitzenberger/Speckesser (2005). Klose/Bender (2000) use a
preliminary version of the data. Fitzenberger/Speckesser (2005) use the final
data covering the period 1993–1997, while Lechner et al. (2004) base their
study on data covering the larger period of 1993 to 2002.
Klose/Bender (2000) do not find any positive effects, which might be due to
the preliminary character of their data. In contrast, Lechner et al. (2004) as
well as Fitzenberger/Speckesser (2005) come to quite optimistic results.
Fitzenberger/Speckesser (2005) find negative locking-in effects on the em-
ployment rate in the short run and significantly positive effects in the long run
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Lechner et al.(2004) suggest that short and long training have positive effects
on employment rates in the short run. In the long run short training and re-
training show positive results. Furthermore, they find significantly positive
effects on monthly earnings for short and long training.
AsdelineatedinSection3,thereformchangedtheusageandsetupoftraining
in various aspects.First,positive effects might be expected from the reduction
ofparticipantsanddeliberatecreamskimmingaspartoftheselectionprocess.
Second, the duration of programmes has been reduced and participation will
take place, on average, at an earlier stage in the unemployment spell. Third,
course quality is expected to improve by increased competition between pro-
viders and the priority of efficiency criteria.
The study evaluating training measures post-Hartz was conducted by IZA/
DIW/infas (2005) and uses administrative data and survey data to compare
the effect of training measures before the reform in the period 2000 to 2003
witheffectsafterthereformintheperiod2003to2005.Theresultsconfirmthe
previous results of severe locking-in effects. They suggest that the positive
results in the medium and long run are based on the positive employment
effect on persons who otherwise would have drifted into non-participation.
Furthermore, effects of pre-reform measures seem to be less positive when
taking employment stability into account. As expected, the results indicate
that the reform succeeded in significantly reducing locking in effects, though
evidence on long-term effects of the modified training measures are not yet
available at the time being. The cost-effectiveness of measures before the
reform was negative. By reducing course durations and better targeting, the
reform was able to reduce the gap between costs and benefits, though the
balance is still negative.
Job Creation Schemes
For a long time, job creation schemes could be evaluated only for East
Germany because data sources that provide information on participation in
job creation schemes were limited to East Germany only. These are the
Labour Market Monitor East which is used by Hübler (1997), the Labour
Market Monitor of the federal state Saxony-Anhalt, which is used by
Bergemann et al.(2000),Eichler/Lechner (2002) and Bergemann (2005),and
the Mikrozensus Saxony used by Reinowski et al.(2003).
None of the studies finds positive effects on the employment rate,apart from
Eichler/Lechner (2002) who find positive employment effects, although for
men only.Reinowski et al.(2003) use the hazard rate of transition from unem-
ployment to employment as a dependent variable, where unemployment
spells include periods of participation. They do not find positive effects of
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pationsignificantlyincreasesthereemploymentprobability.Furthermore,she
reports significantly positive effects on men’s and women’s probability to
remain employed. Caliendo et al. (2003) use the recently derived adminis-
trative data for the years 2000–2002, which provides information on
programme effects in West Germany for the first time.Their results are pessi-
mistic, revealing negative mean employment effects. Positive employment
effects are limited to few socio-demographic groups, namely women over 50,
long-term unemployed and hard-to-place women in West Germany as well as
female long-term unemployed in East Germany. However, since the obser-
vation period is rather short, the negative effects might represent locking-in
effects similar to the ones found for training programmes.
The evaluation study by SÖSTRA/Compass/IMU/PIW (2005) provides new
evidence for the period 2000 – 2004.At the time being,results on job creation
schemes after Hartz are still preliminary.The authors use administrative data
of persons who entered job creation measures in April of the years 2000 to
2004. Control groups are constructed using matching methods. The
programme effect on the probability to leave unemployment is assessed by
comparingthesurvivalfunctionsoftreatedandnon-treatedgroups,whereun-
employment spells include the time spent in unemployment before partici-
pation started. The study confirms the generally negative effects of partici-
pation in job creation measures for time periods before Hartz,though effects
seem to be positive in the long-run in West Germany.The results suggest that
the detrimental effects of job creation measures regarding unemployment du-
rationareentirelycausedbythelocking-inofparticipants,whilestigmaeffects
do not seem to play a role. Regarding effects of the Hartz reforms, the study
finds negative treatment effects for the post-reform period, too, although the
magnitude of the effects seems to have decreased. Since 2004 it has been a
lawful objective of job creation schemes to generate or preserve “employ-
ability” of participants, rather than actual employment only. As yet the ev-
idence on impacts of job creation measures on employability is inconclusive.
4. (b) Activating the Unemployed
The Hartz reform shifts priority towards active measures that require




review evaluation studies of such measures before the reform, if applicable,
and subsequently focus on the novel evidence post-reform.
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The challenge of controlling adequately for self selection is especially difficult
in the context of integration subsidies.Here,selection into treatment does not
only depend on the characteristics of the participant, but also on character-
istics of the potential employer who will receive the subsidy.The case worker,
moreover,has a wide scope of discretion for determining whether the charac-
teristics of employer and employee jointly satisfy the criteria required for the
subsidy. There are only two studies on the effects of integration subsidies
before Hartz. Jaenichen (2002) collects administrative data from selected
Federal Employment Agency districts throughout Germany covering the
period 1999–2001. She finds that participating in integration subsidy
programmes significantly reduces the probability of a worker to be registered
as unemployed.In the long run,when the subsidy usually expired,the effect is
still positive, although significant only in East Germany. Hujer et al. (2004b)
use firm data to examine whether employing subsidized workers affects the
employment development of firms. Based on the IAB establishment panel
data covering the years 1995–1999 they cannot find any significant effects.
The Hartz reform provided the opportunity to circumvent the selection
problemsthathavebeenoutlinedabove,bychangingtheeligibilityconditions
for integration subsidies. The study by ZEW/IAB/IAT (2005) uses adminis-
trative data of the years 2000 to 2003 and exploits the fact that since the be-
ginning of 2002 older unemployed workers do no longer need to satisfy the
condition of being long-term unemployed in order to be eligible for inte-
grationsubsidies.Theeffectofwagesubsidiesontheemploymentprospectsof
older workers is assessed using a Difference-in-Differences estimator. The
results indicate that integration subsidies increase the probability to be em-
ployed 6 months after entering unemployment by 2 percentage points. These
effects seem to stem from significant positive effects in East Germany only,
while in West Germany the effects are insignificant. Within the target group
the number of windfall beneficiaries seems to be low.The longer term effects
ofintegrationsubsidiesontheprobabilityofbeingemployedafterthesubsidy
ends is assessed using propensity score matching.The results suggest that,de-
pendingontype,lengthandtargetgroupofthesubsidy,thisprobabilityis20to
50 percentage points higher for the treatment than the for the comparison
group.However,there are some indications of windfall gains.
Start-up Subsidies
Only little empirical evidence exists on the effectiveness of the “bridging al-
lowance” start-up subsidy for the unemployed. The study by Pfeiffer/Reize
(2000) compares firm survival and employment growth of start-ups by unem-
ployed persons receiving bridging allowance and other, regular start-ups,
based on firm data from 15 regions in East and West Germany.The results in-
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not differ from unsubsidised start-ups. The Hartz evaluation study by IAB/
DIW/Sinus/GfA/infas (2005) also provides results on the effectiveness of the
bridging allowance before the reform.The analysis is based on administrative
dataofcohortsenteringunemploymentin2000whichareobserveduntil2002.
The effectiveness of start-up subsidies is assessed using matching methods.
The authors suspect, however, that some selection bias might remain due to
unobservablecharacteristicsofunemployedwhodecidetostart-upabusiness.
The results show that 6 months after the bridging allowance expires the effect
is still significantly positive on a high level, especially for women. For the
period after the reform, the data is complemented with survey data for the
treatment and control group. The study confirms the positive results of
bridging allowance after the reform.
For the second, new type of start-up subsidy, the so-called “Ich-AG” or “Me,
Inc.”subsidy,most participants are still receiving the subsidy at the end of the
observation period.Information on effects after eligibility expires is therefore
not available yet. However, the subsidy, which gradually diminishes, is gen-
erally very low at the end of the observation period. Therefore, the signifi-
cantly positive effects that can be observed at that stage might be expected to
persist further as well. At the same time the study reports indications of
windfall gains as a substantial number of start-up subsidy recipients report
that they would have started a business also without the subsidy.These figures
amount to around 25–60% for bridging allowance recipients, and to 60–70%
of individuals in the “Me, Inc.” scheme. Even for these businesses, however,
the subsidy might still have exerted a positive effect during the first months in
business,rather than on business creation per se.
Wage Protection for Older Workers
Wage protection is a wage subsidy for workers aged 50 and older who take up
employment in a job that pays less than the previous job. The effect of the
subsidy on the employment prospects of older workers is studied by ZEW/
IAB/IAT (2005). The analysis employs a difference-in-differences estimator
using administrative data from the years 2002 and 2003, where workers aged
50 or 51 are the treatment group and workers aged 48 or 49 are the control
group.The results indicate a positive though insignificant effect of the subsidy.
The authors suggest that the insignificance might be due to low take-up of
wage protection.
Employment with Reduced Social Security Contributions (Mini-/Midijob)
Various reform elements, including the introduction of Mini-/Midijobs, are
evaluated in terms of their impact on the general structure of employment.
These studies are part of the report by RWI Essen et al. (2005). The intro-
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between 400 and 800 ¤ (Midijobs), and the reform of marginal employment
waivingsocialsecuritycontributionsforincomesbelow400¤(Minijobs)isex-
pected to increase the number of persons working in these earnings segments.
The introduction of Mini- and Midijobs constitutes a “universal treatment”,
i.e. everybody in the labour market is affected, and no comparison group
without treatment exists. Its effects are examined by first estimating the indi-
vidual probability of each worker to be employed in the respective earning
segment before the reform, using a fixed-effects linear probability model.
Then, assuming that structural parameters would have remained identical
without the reform, the counterfactual probability of employment in these
segments is estimated on the basis of post-reform data utilizing the estimated
pre-reform parameters. The reform effect is then given by the difference
betweentheestimatedpost-reformprobabilitiesusingpre-reformcoefficients
and the actual post-reform probabilities.
The results show that the introduction of reduced social security subsidies for
Midijobs caused a significant increase of about 125,000 in the number of em-
ployees in this income range, while the Minijob reform caused a huge ex-
pansionofemploymentinthisearningssegment(+1.8millionMinijobsdueto
the reform). However, incidence of intra-enterprise displacement of regular
jobs cannot be ruled out. Moreover, employees who benefit from the regu-
lations have rarely been previously unemployed, in spite of hopes associated
with this policy that especially unemployed individuals would increasingly
take on Mini- and Midijobs.This might be due to the fact that the marginal tax
on people who move from unemployment to employment is still very high.
4. (c) Labour Market Deregulation
AsisthecasefortheevaluationoftheMinijobsandMidijobsreforms,deregu-
lation policies regarding temporary work and fixed-term contracts are
evaluatedwithrespecttothegeneralemploymentstructure.Theexemptionof
small firms from dismissal protection regulation, however, was not subject to
an evaluation.
Deregulation of Temporary Work
The reform of temporary work regulations is evaluated in the report by RWI
Essenetal.(2005)applyingthesamemethodologyforuniversaltreatmentsas
for the Mini-/Midijob evaluation outlined above.The results indicate that the
reform significantly increased the number of employees in the temporary
work sector in the two quarters after the reform. No data is available yet for
longer periods.
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The effect of old-age workers being exempt from restrictions on fixed-term
contracts is assessed by RWI Essen et al. (2005) using a Difference-in-
Difference estimator.Workers just above the minimum age for exemption (52
to 53 years) constitute the treatment group,while workers just below this age
(50-51 years) are the control group. The exemption of old workers above 52
years of age from restrictions on fixed-term contracts is expected to increase
thenumberofoldworkersholdingfixed-termcontracts.Theanalysisdoesnot
reveal any significant treatment effects. This might be due, however, to the
short observation period, since currently data are available for only three
months after the exemption was introduced.
Summary of Policy Effectiveness Before and After Hartz
Table 2 presents an overview of the effectiveness of various policy measures
before and after Hartz. The table follows the previous structure of Section 4
(also used in Section 3) in distinguishing between reform elements that aim at
(a)increasingeffectivenessandefficiencyoflabourmarketservicesandpolicy
measures, (b) activating the unemployed, and (c) deregulating the labour
market.Thesecondcolumnsummarisestheestimatedeffectsoftherespective
policy arising from the available set of evaluation studies conducted before
Hartz.Obviously,for several policies,such as the newly introduced placement
vouchers, such an assessment is not applicable. The third column summarises
the results obtained for each measure in the comprehensive evaluation on the
effectivenessoftheHartzreforms(cf.alsoBundesregierung2006;Kaltenborn
et al. 2006). Column 4 then intends to assess the “before-after difference”,
which – with explicit caution – could be interpreted as a „reform effect“ of the
measure. The caution results from the fact that, whereas the before-after dif-
ference may indeed be caused by the redesign of the measure, it is also con-
ceivable that the overall change in the institutional framework of the labour
and placement markets is responsible for differentially effective policies pre-
and post-Hartz.Also,some evaluation studies before Hartz are quite distinct
in their specific focus from those conducted after Hartz – e.g.the studies con-
cerning general placement services – and hence not directly comparable.
Another caveat when interpreting the results is the fact that the post-reform
observation period is short-term only.
The table summarizes the results discussed in more detail in the previous sub-
sections. Training and public job creation schemes, which were both already
usedandevaluatedextensivelybeforethereform,appeartobeimproved.The
“improvement” of public job creation schemes, however, unfortunately
merely implies the fact that since the reform they appear less detrimental for
participants’ employment prospects than before. For another re-designed
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(a) Increasing effectiveness and efficiency of labour market services and policy measures
Placement Services
General (+) (+) (+) Introduction of one-stop-
centres seems positive,but
significance of effects unclear




n/a 0 0 No significant effect on
re-employment probability
Placement via temporary work
(PSA)







+ + Exit rate to employment
increased,locking-in effects
reduced
Public job creation – (–) – Measure remains detrimental
after the reform
(+) Magnitude of negative effect
decreases
Impact on “employability”unclear
(b) Activating the unemployed
Wage subsidies to employers
(Integration subsidies)2
(+) + + 20–50 percentage points higher





(+)3 + + Subsidy significantly reduces risk




Wage protection for elderly n/a 0 0 No significant effect.
Minijobs n/a + + Reform caused large increase in
employees in Minijobs (+1.8 Mill.).
(–) Inflow from unemployment
low.Incidence of intra-enterprise
displacement cannot be ruled out
Midijobs n/a (+) (+) Modest effect on creation of
Midijobs (+125,000).Incidence of
intra-enterprise displacement
cannot be ruled out
(c) Fostering employment demand by labour market deregulation
Temporary work deregulation n/a + + 23,700 additional employees in
temporary work 6 months after
reform (short-term).Deregulation
widely acclaimed
Fixed-term contracts for elderly n/a 0 0 No significant effect
1Labourmarketeffects:+positive,(+)modestlypositive,0zero,(–)modestlynegative,–negative.
– 2Already since early 2002.– 3Pre-reform evidence on bridging allowance only.
Table 2measure, wage subsidies, the reform provided the first opportunity to consis-
tently evaluate its effects and thus to reveal its apparently high effectiveness.
Several new measures – placement voucher,assignment to private placement
providers, fixed-term contracts for the elderly – do not display significant
effects, which may be due to de facto ineffective or small-scale policies, or
perhaps due to the fact that the post-reform observation period is not yet long
enough. While placement via temporary work (PSA) shows negative
treatment effects,the new start-up subsidy significantly reduces the risk of un-
employment.Both the deregulation of the temporary work sector and the in-
troduction and reform, respectively, of jobs with reduced social security con-
tributions (Midijobs and Minijobs) appear to have created additional em-
ployment opportunities in the respective labour market segments. However,
intra-enterprise displacement effects cannot be ruled out. The general re-
design of the public employment services appears promising.
On balance,we therefore find that the Hartz reforms in their entirety seem to
havecontributedtoabetterfunctioningoftheGermanlabourmarketandthe
effectiveness of specific active labour market policies. This positive as-
sessment, however, has to be qualified somewhat in light of the fact that the
starting point upon which the reforms intended to improve had been quite
dismal.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have pictured the features of German labour market policy
and delineated the rationale for the Hartz reforms implemented in the years
2003–2005. We have described the main underlying principles and the corre-
sponding policy changes. Thereafter we have surveyed the existing evidence
on the effects of active labour market policy before and after the reforms.
German ALMP before Hartz was dominated by training and public job
creation measures. These measures were characterised by a long duration
compared to other countries.Especially in East Germany the extensive use of
job creation measures created a sheltered labour market of substantial mag-
nitude. In contrast, measures directly supporting integration into regular em-
ployment (e.g. wage subsidies and start-up subsidies) were introduced rela-
tively recently and played a minor role before. Assignment to programmes
was not based on a systematic profiling of costumers.Generally,job search as-
sistance and monitoring by the public employment agency was given rather
low priority. It was argued that the main weaknesses of the former labour
market policy in Germany were,firstly,public employment services operating
inefficiently,and secondly,the fact that the interplay of active policy measures
with the generous benefit system created adverse work incentives that re-
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into the regular labour market.
The Hartz reforms aimed at improving employment services and policy
measures, and activating the unemployed. Public employment services were
modernised along the lines of New Public Management. This includes
results-based accountability of local employment agencies, outsourcing of
many services and open competition between private service providers. The
former employment offices were converted into costumer-orientated
one-stop-centres, offering individual profiling, job search assistance, social
services and administration of benefit payments. Furthermore, various policy
changes implement an activation strategy according to the principles of
“rights and duties”. First, the entire benefit system was re-designed. Unem-
ployment benefit levels and durations were reduced. Eligibility for sub-
sistence allowances now differs according to a person’s ability to work rather
than previous contribution payments, as was the case before. Benefit re-
cipients may also be subject to sanctions, mainly benefit reductions, if duties
are not complied with. Second, priority is given to measures that support un-
employed workers who are pro-actively seeking integration into regular em-
ployment,most importantly wage subsidies and start-up subsidies.Third,jobs
with reduced social security contributions were introduced (Midijobs), and
the regulation for jobs exempt from such contributions was reformed
(Minijobs),bothwiththeintentiontoprovidehigherincentivesforindividuals
to take on employment in the low wage sector.
Results of evaluation studies of German active labour market policies have
been rather inconsistent for many years.Probably this was due to a lack of ap-
propriate data,or to the sensitivity of results with respect to different identifi-
cation strategies.However,due to better data,advances in methodology and a
higher consensus on identification strategies, recent evaluation studies seem
to be able to provide more robust and consistent results. For the pre-Hartz
period, it can be concluded e.g. that most training measures seem to show a
considerable dynamic in programme effects, having negative (locking-in)
effectsintheshort-runandatendencytowardspositiveemploymenteffectsin
the long run.Based on such results,future cost-benefit analyses might be able
totradecostsofnegativeshort-runeffectsagainstbenefitsofpositivelong-run
effects. Moreover, there is evidence that job creation schemes perform badly
on average in the short run, and actually bring about impaired employment
prospects for participants. The (limited) evidence on wage subsidies and
start-up subsidies pre-Hartz indicates modestly positive effects of such
measures.
The comprehensive evaluation of the Hartz reforms, which involves more
than 20 research institutions and a total of about 100 researchers, has
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measures has modestly improved. The results, which are still preliminary at
the time being, indicate that the re-organisation of public employment
services was mainly successful, with the exception of the outsourcing of
services.Re-designing training programmes seems to have improved their ef-
fectiveness, while job creation schemes continue to be detrimental. Policy
measures such as the redesigned wage subsidies and start-up subsidies show
significantly positive effects. Thus, the new strategy, with more emphasis on
wage subsidies and start-up subsidies and less emphasis on training and public
job creation schemes, seems to be a promising mix of active labour market
policies, moving the German labour market in the right direction. It seems
clear,however,considering the continuing crisis of the German economy,that
further steps have to be taken.
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